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  Introduction:	  	  The	  Hegemonious	  Semantic	  Approach	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Accoridng	  to	  Halvorson,	  echoing	  Suppe	  from	  almost	  thirty	  years	  ago	  (Suppe	  1989,	  p.	  3),	  ‘[w]ithin	  a	  few	  short	  decades,	  the	  semantic	  approach	  [SA]	  has	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  new	  orthodoxy’	  (Halvorson	  2012).1	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  SA	  has	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  so	  well	  entrenched	  is	  that	  it	  has	  proved	  itself	  adaptable	  to	  both	  realist	  and	  anti-­‐realist	  stances.	  Here	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  its	  adoption	  by	  structural	  realists,	  including	  myself,	  who	  have	  done	  so	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  wears	  its	  structuralist	  sympathies	  on	  its	  sleeve	  (Ladyman	  1998).	  Despite	  this,	  the	  SA	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  standing	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  ontological	  commitments	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘ontic’	  form	  of	  this	  view	  and	  so	  I	  plan	  to	  explore	  that	  tension	  before	  discussing	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  SA	  in	  framing	  scientific	  representation	  before	  concluding	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  theories	  and	  models	  themselves. 	  The	  Semantic	  Approach	  and	  Structural	  	   	   	   	   	  Realism	  	   	  	  The	  debate	  over	  structural	  realism	  is	  extensive	  and	  a	  number	  of	  more	  or	  less	  stable	  positions	  have	  now	  crystallized.	  So-­‐called	  ‘epistemic’	  structural	  realism	  states	  that	  all	  that	  we	  can	  know	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  world	  and	  that	  we	  must	  remain	  agnostic	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  things	  over	  and	  above,	  or	  ‘behind’	  that	  structure	  (Worrall	  2012).	  This	  faces	  the	  criticism	  that	  insisting	  on	  the	  epistemic	  inaccessibility	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  things	  runs	  counter	  to	  the	  scientific	  ethos	  of	  the	  last	  few	  hundred	  years	  (Psillos	  2001)	  or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  sounds	  suspiciously	  Kantian.	  The	  alternative	  ‘ontic’	  form	  argues	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  above	  claim,	  we	  should	  accept	  that	  all	  that	  there	  is,	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  world	  (Ladyman	  1998;	  Ladyman	  and	  Ross	  2007).	  Thus,	  in	  effect,	  the	  nature	  of	  things	  gets	  cashed	  out	  in	  entirely	  structural	  terms.	  	  	   This	  stance	  has	  twin	  motivations:	  first,	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  infamous	  Pessimistic	  Meta-­‐Induction	  (PMI)	  and	  the	  supposedly	  problematic	  nature	  of	  inter-­‐theoretic	  ontological	  continuity	  in	  general	  (and	  here	  the	  partial	  structures	  form	  of	  SA	  has	  been	  deployed	  to	  capture	  ‘diachronic’	  inter-­‐theory	  relations	  as	  well	  as	  ‘synchronic’);	  secondly,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  accommodating	  the	  implications	  of	  quantum	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Submitted	  to	  Synthese	  Special	  Issue	  on	  New	  Thinking	  in	  Scientific	  Realism.	  Many	  thanks	  to	  Emma	  Ruttkamp-­‐Bloem	  and	  the	  other	  organisers	  for	  inviting	  me	  to	  the	  associated	  conference	  in	  Cape	  Town,	  Aug.	  2014	  and	  to	  Anjan	  Chakravartty,	  Juha	  Saatsi,	  Pete	  Vickers	  and	  others	  for	  useful	  comments	  and	  criticisms.	  1	  However,	  whereas	  Suppe’s	  intention	  was	  to	  praise	  the	  semantic	  approach,	  Halvorson’s	  is	  to	  damn	  it!	  For	  a	  response	  see	  van	  Fraassen,	  2014.	  
physics	  which	  render	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  objecthood	  problematic	  (French	  and	  Ladyman	  2003).	  	  	   This	  ontic	  structural	  realism	  (OSR)	  then	  divides	  into	  two	  sub-­‐forms:	  ‘Moderate’	  OSR,	  which	  retains	  a	  notion	  of	  object	  but	  only	  as	  metaphysically	  ‘thin’	  or	  as	  having	  ‘contextual’	  identity,	  sufficient	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  function	  as	  relata	  in	  the	  structure	  (Esfeld,	  and	  Lam,	  	  2011;	  Ladyman,	  2009;	  French	  and	  Ladyman	  2011);	  Eliminativist	  OSR,	  which	  eliminates	  objects	  in	  favour	  of	  what	  it	  claims	  is	  a	  wholly	  structural	  metaphysics	  (French,	  2014).	  Note,	  first	  of	  all,	  that	  the	  SA	  is	  deployed	  in	  this	  context	  to	  represent	  structure	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  as	  it	  were,	  whereas	  said	  structure	  is	  presented	  within	  the	  theory	  (for	  example,	  via	  group	  theory	  in	  the	  case	  of	  modern	  physics)	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  science	  itself	  (see	  French	  2014	  Ch.	  5	  for	  further	  discussion).	  Of	  course,	  insofar	  as	  the	  SA	  is	  set-­‐theoretic,	  what	  we	  have	  is	  an	  exemplification	  of	  Suppes’	  famous	  exhortation	  that	  we	  (philosophers)	  should	  use	  the	  same	  representational	  devices	  as	  science	  itself	  –	  that	  is,	  mathematics.	  Here	  the	  distinction	  is	  only	  between	  the	  way	  structure	  is	  presented	  within	  a	  theory,	  for	  scientists’	  purposes,	  and	  how	  that	  structure	  is	  then	  represented,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  	  	   The	  second	  point	  to	  note	  is	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  both	  Moderate	  and	  Eliminativist	  OSR	  we	  adopt	  an	  iterative	  approach	  towards	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  set	  within	  the	  SA	  (that	  is,	  the	  A	  in	  <A,	  R>).	  The	  idea	  is	  as	  follows:	  we	  begin	  by	  designating	  the	  relevant	  set	  in	  ‘everyday’	  scientific	  terms,	  as	  the	  set	  of	  hadrons	  for	  example.	  We	  then	  argue	  that	  all	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  hadrons	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  structural	  terms	  (drawing	  in	  the	  way	  that	  spin	  and	  mass	  drop	  out	  of	  the	  Poincaré	  group	  of	  space-­‐time	  symmetries,	  for	  example),	  thereby	  effectively	  reconceptualising	  the	  particles	  as	  elements	  or	  features	  of	  the	  relevant	  structure(s).	  The	  moderate	  structural	  realist	  then	  insists	  that	  we	  can	  still	  retain	  a	  notion	  of	  objecthood	  here,	  only	  that	  it	  is	  metaphysical	  ‘thin’	  in	  that	  the	  very	  identity	  of	  the	  particles	  qua	  objects	  is	  given	  in	  ‘contextual’	  or	  structural	  terms.	  The	  eliminativist,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  pushes	  the	  line	  that	  with	  all	  that	  there	  is	  about	  the	  particles,	  including	  even	  their	  identity,	  cashed	  out	  in	  such	  terms,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  retain	  a	  notion	  of	  object;	  thus,	  particles-­‐as-­‐objects	  are	  eliminated	  in	  favour	  of	  particles-­‐as-­‐features-­‐of-­‐structure.	  Note	  further	  that	  such	  a	  metaphysical	  move	  does	  not	  block	  physicists,	  or	  us,	  from	  
talking	  about	  hadrons	  etc.,	  as	  there	  are	  further	  metaphysical	  devices	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  continue	  to	  do	  that,	  while	  denying	  that	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  objects	  (again	  see	  French	  2014).	  	   But	  how	  can	  we	  use	  set	  theory	  to	  represent	  the	  structure	  that	  Eliminative	  OSR	  takes	  ontologically	  seriously?	  Here	  I	  shall	  consider	  two	  answers:	  the	  first	  insists	  that	  we	  simply	  can’t	  and	  so	  we	  have	  to	  shift	  to	  a	  new	  representational	  framework;	  the	  second	  maintains	  that	  we	  can,	  as	  long	  as	  we	  adopt	  a	  particular	  manoeuvre	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Poincaré.	  	  	   The	  first	  answer	  admits	  that	  the	  formal	  framework	  of	  SA	  must	  be	  abandoned	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  eliminativist	  OSR,	  since	  it	  still	  retains	  objects	  as	  the	  A.	  If	  one	  were	  to	  accept	  that,	  then	  perhaps	  the	  most	  obvious	  alternative	  is	  category	  theory,	  as	  advocated	  by	  Bain,	  Landry,	  Rickles	  and	  others	  (see	  Bain	  2013;	  Landry	  2007).	  The	  overall	  strategy	  is	  then	  as	  follows:	  we	  take	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  category	  to	  represent	  the	  models	  of	  theory	  and	  thus	  the	  structure	  we	  are	  interested	  in.	  The	  definition	  of	  
an	  element	  (of	  an	  object	  of	  the	  relevant	  category)	  within	  the	  category	  theoretic	  framework	  then	  eliminates	  explicit	  reference	  to	  such	  elements,	  that	  is	  -­‐	  physical	  objects.	  There	  are	  then	  two	  possible	  sub-­‐strategies	  that	  one	  can	  adopt:	  	  Representation:	  translate	  all	  set-­‐theoretic	  descriptions	  into	  category	  theoretic	  terms,	  thereby	  yielding	  a	  reformulation	  of	  the	  set	  theoretic	  notion	  of	  element	  of	  set	  in	  such	  terms.	  	  Presentation:	  construct	  the	  relevant	  category	  theoretic	  models	  of	  physics	  ‘directly’	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Baez,	  2006).	  	  Adopting	  the	  first,	  we	  obtain	  a	  description	  of	  the	  relevant	  physical	  structure	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  that	  does	  not	  contain	  reference	  to	  objects;	  adopting	  the	  second,	  we	  achieve	  the	  same	  but	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  science	  itself.	  	  	   Unfortunately,	  however,	  there	  are	  serious	  concerns	  with	  this	  alternative.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  category	  theory	  in	  effect	  operates	  at	  too	  high	  a	  level	  of	  abstraction	  to	  serve	  our	  realist	  purposes.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  too	  abstract	  to	  be	  of	  use	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  PMI	  or	  in	  capturing	  inter-­‐theoretic	  relations	  in	  general	  (see	  French	  2014	  Ch.6).	  	  Now	  the	  advocate	  of	  category	  theory	  may	  respond	  along	  the	  following	  lines:	  ‘…	  we	  are	  discussing	  an	  equivalence	  between	  two	  theories,	  whose	  models	  will	  generally	  have	  different	  types	  of	  mathematical	  structures	  respectively,	  and	  thus	  do	  not	  live	  in	  the	  same	  category.’	  (Teh,	  forthcoming).	  However,	  although	  this	  may	  be	  true	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  quantum	  gravity,	  say,	  it	  is	  surely	  not	  the	  case	  for	  other	  examples	  such	  as	  the	  shift	  from	  Fresnel’s	  theory	  of	  light	  through	  to	  Maxwell’s	  electromagnetism	  (Worrall	  1989).	  And	  even	  if	  we	  grant,	  as	  we	  should,	  that	  a	  thorough-­‐going	  structuralism	  needs	  to	  accommodate	  a	  range	  of	  mathematical	  structures,	  such	  as	  topological	  spaces,	  vector	  spaces,	  differentiable	  manifolds,	  Boolean	  algebras,	  groups	  and	  so	  on,	  which	  ‘live’	  in	  different	  categories,	  one	  might	  insist	  that	  the	  partial	  structures	  form	  of	  SA	  can	  capture	  the	  relevant	  inter-­‐relationships	  between	  mathematical	  and	  physical	  structures	  perfectly	  adequately	  (see	  Bueno,	  French,	  Ladyman	  2002).	  	   A	  further	  and	  perhaps	  more	  biting	  worry	  is	  that	  the	  above	  category	  theoretic	  strategies	  do	  not	  actually	  eliminate	  the	  relevant	  objects	  (see	  Lam	  and	  	  Wuthrich,	  2014;	  Teh,	  op.	  cit.).	  Thus	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  objects	  are	  eliminated	  from	  only	  some	  ‘models’	  of	  the	  translated	  theory	  or	  they	  are	  eliminated	  in	  name	  only.2	  Furthermore,	  relations	  (as	  usually	  understood)	  are	  eliminated	  also,	  which	  is	  not	  quite	  what	  the	  ontic	  structural	  realist	  wants.	  And	  finally,	  whatever	  notion	  of	  structure	  we	  end	  up	  with	  is	  not	  unproblematic,	  as	  category-­‐theoretic	  structure	  is	  basically	  characterised	  in	  terms	  of	  category	  theoretic	  morphisms	  holding	  between	  category	  theoretic	  objects	  and	  these	  are	  not	  the	  same	  as	  relations	  between	  elements	  (of	  such	  category	  theoretic	  objects)	  which	  is	  what	  the	  structural	  realist	  is	  concerned	  with	  (so	  in	  effect	  we	  return	  to	  the	  first	  concern	  above).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  However,	  this	  point	  does	  not	  bite	  so	  hard,	  as	  it	  obviously	  depends	  on	  what	  one	  means	  by	  ‘in	  name	  only’.	  If	  that	  means,	  eliminates	  objects	  in	  a	  metaphysical	  sense	  but	  not	  in	  the	  everyday	  physicists’	  sense	  of	  particle,	  then	  the	  advocate	  of	  OSR	  may	  cry	  ‘That’s	  good	  enough	  for	  me!’.	  	  
	   Of	  course,	  further	  developments	  may	  assuage	  these	  concerns.	  Certainly,	  a	  core	  issue	  is	  whether	  the	  notions	  of	  relata	  and	  relations	  that	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  here	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  fundamentally	  set-­‐theoretic	  in	  a	  way	  that	  underpins	  the	  SA	  but	  undermines	  eliminativist	  OSR.	  	   Let’s	  consider	  the	  second	  answer.	  We	  recall	  that	  the	  general	  issue	  for	  eliminativism	  is	  how	  to	  talk	  about	  that	  which	  one	  ultimately	  eliminates	  from	  one’s	  ontology	  (here	  we	  might	  look	  at	  eliminativism	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind;	  see	  Rosenberg,	  forthcoming).	  Again,	  one	  might	  adopt	  an	  iterative	  strategy:	  we	  begin	  with	  a	  particular	  domain	  of	  discourse,	  namely	  the	  elementary	  particles.	  As	  a	  first	  iteration,	  we	  represent	  the	  situation	  set	  theoretically	  (broadly	  and	  simply,	  of	  course)	  as	  follows:	  <A,	  R>,	  where	  A	  designates	  the	  set	  of	  particles	  and	  R	  the	  relations	  that	  we	  take	  to	  hold	  between	  them.	  In	  a	  second	  iteration,	  we	  then	  reconceive	  that	  representation	  in	  structuralist	  terms	  by	  effectively	  reading	  <A,	  R>	  ontologically	  from	  right	  to	  left,	  taking	  the	  A	  to	  be	  entirely	  characterised	  –	  their	  properties	  and	  even	  their	  identity	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  R;	  or	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  taking	  all	  the	  features	  of	  the	  A	  to	  be	  ‘grounded’	  in	  the	  R.	  The	  eliminativist	  then	  maintains	  that	  the	  A,	  as	  
objects,	  can	  then	  be	  dispensed	  with	  from	  our	  metaphysics.	  So,	  we	  write	  the	  <A,	  R>	  from	  left	  to	  right,	  of	  course,	  but	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  read	  it,	  ontologically,	  from	  right	  to	  left.	  Note	  two	  things:	  first,	  that	  this	  iterative	  approach	  retains	  the	  ‘two-­‐sorted’	  conception	  inherent	  to	  set-­‐theory	  but	  effectively	  divides	  the	  sorts	  across	  iterations	  or	  levels.	  And	  secondly,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  A	  that	  are	  reconceptualised	  but	  also	  the	  R,	  as	  these	  have	  to	  be	  conceived	  of	  not	  as	  relations	  that	  hold	  ‘between’	  the	  A,	  with	  the	  implication	  that	  the	  A	  have	  some	  prior	  or	  independent	  existence	  from	  the	  R,	  but	  as	  features	  of	  the	  structure	  (of	  the	  world),	  such	  as	  laws	  and	  symmetries,	  that	  yield	  the	  properties	  that	  are	  then	  associated	  with	  (and	  outwith	  the	  structuralist	  framework,	  said	  to	  be	  possessed	  by)	  the	  A.	  The	  point	  is,	  we	  introduce	  something	  for	  representational	  purposes	  that	  we	  then	  ontologically	  reconceive	  and	  eliminate	  altogether.	  	  	   One	  might	  well	  ask	  at	  this	  point	  whether	  such	  a	  manoeuvre	  is	  acceptable.	  Thus,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broadly	  nominalist	  response	  to	  claims	  that	  mathematical	  entities	  are	  indispensable	  in	  scientific	  explanations,	  Melia	  has	  argued	  that	  we	  can	  regard	  such	  objects	  as	  offering	  a	  kind	  of	  explanatory	  scaffolding	  that	  can	  then	  be	  dismissed	  ontologically	  (Melia,	  2000).	  Furthermore,	  and	  more	  generally,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  our	  ontological	  commitments	  must	  be	  read	  off	  the	  representation	  as	  written.	  As	  Azzouni	  has	  urged,	  even	  if	  we	  follow	  a	  Quinean	  reformulation,	  with	  its	  associated	  mantra	  of	  ‘to	  be	  is	  to	  be	  the	  value	  of	  a	  variable’,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  take	  quantifier	  commitment	  to	  yield	  ontological	  commitment	  –	  the	  former	  supports	  at	  best	  only	  a	  	  ‘thin’	  form	  of	  commitment,	  whereas	  much	  more	  is	  required	  to	  underpin	  the	  kind	  of	  commitment	  sought	  be	  the	  realist	  (see	  Azzouni	  and	  Bueno,	  forthcoming).	  Again	  the	  general	  point	  is	  that	  representational	  form	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  appropriate	  guide	  to	  such	  ontological	  commitment.	  	   So,	  coming	  back	  to	  the	  manoeuvre	  itself,	  one	  can	  still	  avail	  oneself	  of	  the	  set-­‐theoretic	  resources	  of	  the	  SA,	  while	  avoiding	  commitment	  to	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  set	  
as	  objects.	  Hence,	  there	  may	  be	  no	  need	  to	  seek	  an	  alternative	  representational	  framework	  for	  structural	  realism.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  are	  other	  concerns	  associated	  with	  the	  SA	  in	  the	  realist	  context	  more	  generally.	  	  
	  	  
Realism	  and	  Representation	  	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  SA	  lie	  in	  Tarskian	  model	  theory	  of	  course	  and	  this	  has	  led	  to	  concerns	  about	  the	  dual	  use	  of	  formal,	  set-­‐theoretic	  models	  to	  both	  underpin	  truth	  (as	  correspondence)	  and	  to	  represent	  theories	  and	  models	  in	  science	  (Chakravartty,	  2001;	  Thomson-­‐Jones,	  2006).	  One	  way	  of	  responding	  to	  such	  concerns	  is	  to	  adopt	  Suppes’	  strategy	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  ‘extrinsic’	  perspective,	  from	  which	  theories	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  families	  of	  (set	  theoretic)	  models	  (related	  via	  partial	  isomorphism	  etc.)	  and	  the	  ‘intrinsic’	  one,	  from	  which	  theories	  are	  seen	  as	  objects	  of	  epistemic	  attitudes,	  such	  as	  belief	  (da	  Costa	  and	  French	  2003).	  On	  the	  former,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  models	  is	  representational	  and	  as	  the	  well-­‐known	  slogan	  of	  the	  SA	  goes,	  to	  present	  a	  theory	  is	  to	  define	  its	  class	  of	  models	  directly.	  On	  the	  latter	  view,	  the	  role	  of	  models	  is	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  relevant	  sentences	  are	  satisfied	  yielding	  truth	  à	  la	  Tarski.	  	  Thus,	  as	  van	  Fraassen	  puts	  it,	  models	  ‘look	  in	  two	  directions	  at	  once’.	  	   Now	  it	  is	  only	  if	  theories	  are	  identified	  with	  set-­‐theoretic	  models	  that	  we	  have	  a	  problem	  but	  unfortunately	  this	  is	  a	  common	  assumption	  regarding	  the	  SA	  (consider	  the	  title	  of	  Halvorson’s	  critique,	  for	  example).	  The	  whole	  debate	  that	  followed	  is	  shaped	  by	  this	  assumption	  that	  the	  SA	  takes	  theories	  to	  be	  set-­‐theoretic,	  an	  assumption	  that	  has	  perhaps	  drawn	  strength	  from	  van	  Fraassen’s	  famous	  claim:	  	  '...	  if	  the	  theory	  as	  such,	  is	  to	  be	  identified	  with	  anything	  at	  all	  -­‐	  if	  theories	  are	  to	  be	  reified	  -­‐	  then	  a	  theory	  should	  be	  identified	  with	  its	  class	  of	  models.'	  (van	  Fraassen,	  1989,	  p.	  222)	  	  But	  note,	  that’s	  a	  big	  ‘if’	  (see	  the	  discussion	  in	  da	  Costa	  and	  French	  2003)!	  And	  one	  option	  is	  to	  deny	  the	  antecedent	  and	  refuse	  to	  identify	  theories	  with	  anything	  –	  but	  I’ll	  get	  to	  that	  shortly.	  	  	   So,	  if	  one	  adopts	  Suppes	  strategy,	  the	  question	  arises,	  what	  is	  a	  theory	  then?	  If	  both	  the	  set-­‐theoretic	  and	  propositional	  characterisations	  are	  merely	  different	  perspectives,	  useful	  for	  different	  purposes,	  what	  exactly	  are	  theories	  themselves?	  This	  is	  a	  question	  that	  is	  sharpened	  in	  the	  current	  context	  where	  the	  realist’s	  traditional	  reliance	  on	  reference	  has	  given	  way	  to	  the	  invocation	  of	  representation	  as	  the	  appropriate	  framework	  for	  describing	  the	  relationship	  between	  theories	  and	  the	  world.	  Accounts	  of	  this	  framework	  have	  drawn	  heavily	  on	  examples	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  art,	  particularly	  in	  painting	  and	  depiction	  more	  generally	  and	  perhaps	  that	  has	  helped	  strengthen	  the	  idea	  that	  representation	  requires	  something	  that	  represents,	  with	  that	  thing	  being	  the	  depiction	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  art,	  and	  the	  theory,	  as	  an	  object,	  in	  science.	  	  	   So,	  what	  kinds	  of	  things	  might	  a	  theory	  or	  model	  be?	  Here	  are	  two	  well-­‐known	  examples.	  	  
Theories	  as	  Abstracta	  	  
So,	  if	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  family	  of	  models	  according	  to	  the	  SA,	  how	  should	  we	  conceive	  of	  the	   latter?	   Giere	   argues	   that	   models	   should	   be	   taken	   to	   be	   abstract	   entities	   that	  satisfy	  a	  certain	   theoretical	  definition	  and	  are	  related	  to	  their	   target	  systems	  via	  a	  theoretical	  hypothesis	  (Giere	  1988,	  p.80ff)..	  And	  they	  are	  abstract	  in	  two	  ways:	  first,	  they	  are	  abstract	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  not	  physically	  realized.	  So,	  in	  this	  sense	  they	  are	  like	  mathematical	  entities.	  Secondly,	  they	  are	  abstract	  in	  that	  they	  are	  only	  partially	  specified;	   so,	   Newton’s	   Laws	   refer	   to	   forces,	   masses,	   accelerations,	   velocities,	  positions,	  and	  times,	  but	  not	  to	  any	  specific	  objects	  or	  quantities.	  (Giere	  2008,	  p.5).	  	   Now	  there	  are	  well-­‐known	  problems	  with	  abstract	  entities,	  not	  least	  how	  it	  is	  that	  we	  come	  to	  know	  them.	  Here	  those	  problems	  have	  a	  particular	  hue,	  as	  theories	  are	  standardly	  regarded	  as	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  that	  scientists	  discover.	  But	  if	  they	  are	  ultimately	   abstract	   entities,	  how	   are	   they	  discoverable?	  Does	   our	   scientific	  mind’s	  eye	   traverse	   the	  (Platonic)	  realm	   in	  which	   they	  exist,	   lighting	  on	  certain	  ones	   that	  can	   then	  be	  developed	  heuristically	  and	  subjected	   to	  confirmation	  or	   falsification?	  And	  in	  that	  case,	  are	  they	  there	  eternally,	  just	  waiting	  to	  be	  discovered?	  	   Popper,	   for	   example,	   thought	   not.	   Famously	   he	   consigned	   theories	   to	   his	  ‘World	  3’	  which	  was	  distinct	  from	  the	  worlds	  of	  material	  entities	  and	  minds.	  But	  this	  world	  was	   open	   to	   two-­‐way	   causal	   interaction;	   theories	   could	   affect	   us	   (Popper’s	  claims	   on	   this	   score	   are	   less	   than	   convincing)	   and	   we	   can	   effect	   them	   –	   we	   can	  create	  and	  change	  theories,	  for	  example	  (Popper	  1978).	  Also	  in	  World	  3	  are	  works	  of	  art	  like	  Hamlet	  and	  Beethoven’s	  Ninth	  Symphony	  and	  Popper’s	  view	  foreshadows	  that	   of	   Thomasson	  who	   suggests	   that	   such	   artworks	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   ‘abstract	  artefacts’	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  although	   they	   lack	  a	   spatio-­‐temporal	   location,	   they	  are	  still	  created,	  come	  into	  existence,	  change,	  and	  may	  cease	  to	  exist	  (Thomasson	  1999;	  Thomasson	   2004).	   It	   is	   through	   their	   creative	   activities	   that	   artists	   bring	   such	  artworks	   into	   existence,	   and	   their	   continued	   existence	   depends	   on	   the	   artists’	  intentionality.	  	  	   At	   this	   point	   a	   number	   of	   questions	   pop	   up:	   does	   the	   artwork	   come	   into	  existence	   at	   the	  moment	   the	   artist	   thinks	   of	   it?	   Or	   does	   it	   come	   into	   existence	   in	  proto-­‐form	   at	   that	   point	   and	   is	   subsequently	   changed	   as	   the	   artist	   develops	   her	  conception	  (think	  of	  Beethoven	  composing	  his	  9th	  over	  6	  years!).	  Related	  questions	  arise	  if	  we	  export	  this	  conception	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science:	  are	  we	  to	  conceive	  of	  Einstein’s	   General	   Theory	   of	   Relativity	   as	   coming	   into	   existence	   over	   a	   period	   of	  years,	  emerging	  from	  the	  shadows	  in	  some	  sense,	  or	  as	  a	  sequence	  of	  theory-­‐stages	  that	   develop	   into	   the	   full	   blown	   entity	   through	   the	   force	   of	   Einstein’s	   intentions?	  Perhaps	  these	  questions	  can	  be	  answered	  satisfactorily,	  but	  here	  is	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  with	  this	  sort	  of	  account:	  how	  does	  engaging	  in	  a	  certain	  practice,	  artistic	  or	  scientific,	  or	  following	  a	  certain	  heuristic	  move,	  create	  an	  artefact	  that	  is	  abstract?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  concrete	  artefact,	  such	  as	  a	  painting	  or	  a	  physical	  model,	   like	  Crick	  and	  Watson’s	   tinplate	   and	  wire	  model	   of	   DNA,	   one	   can	   answer	   this	   question,	   not	  least	   because	   the	   practices	   and	   moves	   considered	   will	   embody	   certain	   causal	  relationships	   that	   one	   can	   understand	   as	   effecting	   the	   final	   product,	   namely	   the	  painting	  or	  model.	  How	  is	  that	  effecting	  established	  in	  the	  case	  of	  abstract	  artifacts?	  Here	  we	  face	  the	  problem	  again	  of	  how	  the	  abstract	  can	  be	  related	  to	  the	  concrete	  in	  such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   latter	   can	   effect	   changes	   in	   the	   former	   and	   Thomasson	   and	  Popper	  owe	  us	  some	  account	  of	  how	  we	  can	  bridge	  that	  gap,	  between	  the	  practice	  
and	  the	  entity	  (for	  further	  exploration	  of	  these	  concerns	  and	  possible	  responses,	  see	  French	  forthcoming).	  	  	  
Theories	  as	  Fictions	  	  Continuing	  the	  exploration	  of	  connections	  between	  the	  philosophy	  of	  art	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  some	  have	  suggested	  that	  theories	  and	  models	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  akin	  to	  works	  of	  literature	  and	  thus	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  fictions	  (see	  Frigg	  and	  Hartmann,	  2006).	  This	  view	  is	  motivated	  not	  just	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  models	  are	  creations	  of	  human	  imagination,	  just	  like	  novels	  and	  plays,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  thought	  that	  like	  the	  latter,	  models	  have	  a	  ‘life’	  or	  rather,	  internal	  structure,	  of	  their	  own	  which	  can	  be	  explored	  and	  developed	  and	  which	  can	  yield	  surprising	  results.	  	  	   Thus	  Frigg	  takes	  models	  to	  be	  objects	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Sherlock	  Holmes	  or	  Frodo	  are	  objects	  –	  namely	  objects	  of	  our	  imagination	  (Frigg	  2010).	  Drawing	  on	  Walton’s	  view	  of	  literary	  fictions	  as	  representational	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  functioning	  as	  a	  props	  in	  certain	  games	  of	  make	  believe,	  (Walton	  1990),	  model	  descriptions	  should	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  props,	  with	  the	  relevant	  rules	  given	  by	  that	  description,	  together	  with	  the	  relevant	  background	  theory,	  the	  assumed	  mathematics	  and	  so	  on	  (Frigg	  2010).	  This	  description,	  and	  the	  associated	  rules,	  may	  become	  fleshed	  out	  or	  otherwise	  developed	  as	  time	  goes	  on,	  so	  this	  account	  can	  accommodate	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  partially	  baked	  idea	  to	  a	  more	  solid	  suggestion	  to	  something	  about	  which	  the	  question	  can	  be	  asked,	  ‘does	  this	  correspond	  to	  the	  target	  system?’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  260).	  	  	   However,	  Toon	  argues	  that	  Walton’s	  antirealism	  about	  fictional	  characters	  sits	  uneasily	  with	  Frigg’s	  account	  (Toon	  2012,	  pp.	  57-­‐59).	  Consider:	  according	  to	  the	  latter,	  model	  M	  represents	  some	  real	  system	  S	  if	  and	  only	  if	  M	  denotes	  S	  and	  there	  is	  some	  ‘key’	  that	  tells	  us	  how	  facts	  about	  M	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  facts	  about	  S.	  But	  if	  one	  imports	  Walton’s	  anti-­‐realist	  stance	  and	  applies	  it	  to	  models,	  then,	  strictly	  speaking,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  facts	  about	  M,	  and	  no	  relevant	  relation	  can	  be	  established	  between	  models	  and	  target	  systems.	  	   Now	  Toon	  sees	  Frigg	  as	  offering	  an	  ‘indirect’	  account	  of	  modelling,	  whereby	  scientists	  modelling	  a	  system	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  describing	  an	  imaginary	  model	  system,	  which	  can	  then	  be	  compared	  to	  a	  fiction.	  Toon,	  by	  contrast,	  argues	  for	  a	  ‘direct’	  approach,	  according	  to	  which	  scientists	  simply	  imagine	  things	  about	  real	  systems.	  So,	  consider	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  modelling	  a	  bob	  on	  the	  end	  of	  a	  spring,	  undergoing	  simple	  harmonic	  motion	  (Toon	  2012,	  pp.	  38ff):	  idealisation	  yields	  a	  ‘prepared	  description’	  of	  the	  spring	  which	  represents	  it	  –	  following	  Walton’s	  view	  –	  by	  prescribing	  imaginings	  about	  it	  (ibid.).	  Just	  as	  the	  passage	  from	  HG	  Wells’	  novel	  The	  
War	  of	  the	  Worlds	  that	  imagines	  St	  Paul’s	  cathedral	  having	  been	  blasted	  by	  the	  Martians	  represents	  St	  Paul’s	  by	  requiring	  us	  to	  so	  imagine	  certain	  things	  about	  it,	  so	  the	  prepared	  description	  of	  the	  spring,	  plus	  the	  associated	  equation	  of	  simple	  harmonic	  motion,	  represent	  it	  by	  virtue	  of	  requiring	  us	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	  bob	  is	  a	  point	  mass,	  air	  resistance	  is	  zero,	  the	  spring	  exerts	  a	  linear	  restoring	  force,	  and	  so	  on.	  Hence,	  statements	  such	  as	  ‘the	  bob	  oscillates	  sinusoidally’	  should	  be	  understood	  not	  as	  assertions	  about	  some	  model-­‐system	  (‘the	  bob	  and	  spring	  system’)	  but	  as	  about	  what	  the	  model	  prescribes	  us	  to	  imagine	  and	  when	  we	  make	  such	  utterances	  we	  are	  engaging	  in	  certain	  acts	  of	  pretence.	  
	   This	  is	  an	  interesting	  account	  that	  deserves	  more	  consideration	  than	  I	  can	  give	  it	  here	  (see	  again	  French	  forthcoming).	  Nevertheless,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  concerns	  with	  it.	  First	  of	  all,	  how	  are	  we	  to	  understand	  representation	  on	  this	  account,	  standardly	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  relation	  holding	  between	  a	  theory	  or	  model	  and	  the	  target	  system	  (see	  French	  2003)?	  On	  Toon’s	  account,	  M	  is	  a	  model-­‐representation	  if	  and	  only	  if	  M	  functions	  as	  a	  prop	  in	  a	  game	  of	  make-­‐believe	  (2012,	  p.	  62)	  and	  thus	  prescribes	  the	  relevant	  imaginings	  (see	  also	  pp.	  81-­‐82).	  Thus,	  to	  state	  the	  obvious	  perhaps,	  his	  view	  of	  representation	  in	  science	  draws	  on	  representation	  in	  works	  of	  fiction,	  rather	  than	  on	  representation	  in	  paintings,	  and	  consequently	  moves	  away	  from	  the	  standard	  relational	  view.	  But	  then	  this	  loses	  many	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  such	  a	  view:	  in	  particular,	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  characterise	  and	  grasp	  the	  way	  inferences	  can	  be	  drawn	  within	  the	  model	  and	  then	  exported	  across	  to	  the	  target	  system,	  allowing	  us	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  the	  latter	  (Bueno	  and	  Colyvan	  2011).	  	  	   Secondly,	  and	  more	  generally,	  there	  is	  the	  worry	  that	  fictions,	  as	  the	  product	  of	  imagination,	  are	  arbitrary	  in	  a	  way	  that	  scientific	  theories	  are	  not	  –	  after	  all,	  not	  just	  anything	  goes	  (cf.	  Nolan,	  2011).	  Of	  course,	  one	  can	  say	  the	  same	  about	  literature	  –	  genres	  and	  sub-­‐genres	  have	  rules	  and	  conventions	  that	  authors	  may	  defy	  at	  their	  peril.	  Likewise,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  models,	  adopting	  Toon’s	  schema,	  not	  any	  old	  story	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  model	  fiction,	  as	  there	  are	  heuristic	  constraints	  that	  shape	  the	  model	  in	  certain	  well-­‐known	  ways.	  Note	  here	  the	  importance	  of	  such	  constraints	  and	  practice	  which	  in	  effect	  carry	  the	  burden,	  from	  our	  perspective,	  of	  delineating	  acceptable	  models	  within	  Toon’s	  framework.	  A	  broader,	  related	  concern	  runs	  as	  follows:	  if	  there	  had	  been	  no	  Conan	  Doyle,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  no	  Sherlock	  Holmes;	  more	  generally,	  if	  there	  were	  no	  humans,	  or	  sentient	  creatures,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  stories	  at	  all.	  If	  models	  are	  fictions,	  then	  it	  would	  follow	  that	  we	  would	  have	  to	  say	  something	  similar:	  if	  there	  were	  no	  Einstein,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  General	  Relativity	  and	  if	  there	  were	  no	  humans	  in	  general,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  theories.	  	  	   Now,	  of	  course,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  curved	  space-­‐time	  or	  whatever.	  We	  are	  not	  talking	  about	  whatever	  it	  is	  that	  theories	  purportedly	  refer	  to	  or	  represent	  but	  rather	  whether	  the	  theories	  themselves	  would	  exist	  or	  not.	  So,	  if	  there	  had	  been	  no	  Einstein,	  would	  there	  have	  been	  no	  GR?	  Famously	  Hilbert	  was	  supposed	  to	  have	  been	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  publishing	  his	  version	  of	  General	  Relativity,	  when	  Einstein	  ‘got	  there’	  before	  him	  and	  in	  general	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  multiple	  discovery	  might	  provide	  some	  reassurance	  that	  even	  if	  certain	  individuals	  had	  not	  existed,	  the	  relevant	  theories	  would	  still	  have	  been	  imagined	  (on	  the	  fictionalist	  account).	  Nevertheless	  one	  might	  be	  sceptical	  of	  multiple	  discovery	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  within	  the	  history	  of	  science,	  noting	  that,	  for	  example,	  Wallace’s	  theory	  of	  evolution	  was	  not,	  in	  fact,	  the	  same	  as	  Darwin’s,	  nor	  were	  Lorentz’s	  or	  Poincaré’s	  accounts	  the	  same	  as	  Einstein’s	  Special	  Theory	  of	  Relativity.	  As	  for	  Hilbert	  and	  GR,	  setting	  aside	  the	  contentious	  priority	  issue,	  it	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  although	  Hilbert	  ‘had’	  the	  field	  equations,	  he	  and	  Einstein	  not	  only	  proceeded	  via	  very	  different	  trains	  of	  thought	  but	  developed	  their	  accounts	  along	  very	  different	  philosophical	  and	  epistemological	  lines,	  so	  that	  the	  former’s	  theory,	  insofar	  as	  it	  was	  a	  unification	  of	  gravity	  with	  electromagnetism,	  was	  not,	  in	  fact,	  the	  same	  as	  GR	  (see	  for	  example	  Brading	  and	  Ryckman	  2008).	  What	  is	  at	  issue	  here	  is	  whether	  a	  theory	  
just	  ‘is’	  the	  relevant	  equations,	  as	  Hertz	  is	  supposed	  to	  have	  said	  about	  Maxwell’s	  electromagnetism,	  or,	  more	  generally,	  what	  the	  identity	  conditions	  for	  theories	  might	  be.	  As	  we’ll	  see	  shortly,	  I	  feel	  no	  compunction	  to	  address	  this	  issue.	  	   And	  of	  course,	  the	  fictionalist	  will	  surely	  agree	  that	  indeed,	  if	  Einstein	  had	  not	  existed,	  GR	  may	  not	  have	  been	  proposed,	  either	  not	  in	  the	  form	  by	  which	  we	  know	  it	  or,	  perhaps,	  not	  in	  any	  form	  –	  science	  may	  just	  have	  halted	  with	  classical	  physics,	  for	  all	  sorts	  of	  reasons.	  Likewise	  for	  the	  more	  general	  question:	  if	  there	  had	  been	  no	  human	  beings,	  then	  there	  would	  have	  been	  no	  novels,	  no	  literature	  and	  similarly,	  no	  scientific	  theories,	  since	  these	  are	  all	  regarded	  as	  products	  of	  human	  imagination.	  Of	  course	  on	  this	  view	  one	  has	  to	  be	  careful	  with	  talk	  of	  scientific	  discoveries	  –	  features	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  may	  be	  discovered	  (if	  one	  is	  a	  realist)	  but	  theories	  are	  created	  and	  insistence	  on	  discovery	  here	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  begging	  the	  question.	  	   But	  finally,	  there	  are	  further	  concerns	  to	  do	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  imagination	  and	  whether	  it	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  extended	  to	  theories	  as	  the	  fictionalist	  insists.	  As	  Weisberg	  remarks,	  ‘…	  while	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  imagine	  the	  content	  of	  finite,	  deterministic,	  individualistic	  models	  like	  a	  population	  of	  genes	  undergoing	  assortment,	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  this	  procedure	  could	  generalize	  to	  more	  complex	  cases.’	  (2013	  p.	  63).	  In	  particular,	  how	  might	  probabilistic	  interactions	  be	  imagined,	  when	  any	  given	  fictional	  scenario	  can	  only	  be	  a	  single	  instantiation	  of	  such	  interactions	  (ibid.)?	  Given	  the	  prevalence	  of	  probabilistic	  features	  in	  many	  models	  in	  current	  science,	  from	  physics	  to	  the	  social	  sciences,	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  real	  problem.	  The	  notion	  of	  imagining	  brought	  over	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  literature	  and	  specifically	  Walton’s	  ideas	  of	  props	  in	  games	  in	  make-­‐believe	  appears	  heavily	  biased	  towards	  visual	  imagination,	  not	  surprisingly.	  But	  now	  a	  concern	  arises	  whether	  this	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  scientific	  context,	  especially	  when	  we	  move	  away	  from	  the	  more	  straightforward	  examples	  such	  as	  simple	  pendula	  or	  weights	  on	  a	  spring.	  One	  might	  appeal	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  distinction	  between	  ‘sensory’	  and	  ‘conceptual’	  imagination,	  with	  the	  former	  associated	  with	  forming	  a	  mental	  image	  and	  the	  latter	  with	  entertaining	  certain	  possibilities	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  helpful	  this	  is	  –	  how	  is	  conceptual	  imagination	  distinct	  from	  the	  kinds	  of	  conceptual	  explorations	  that	  advocates	  of	  alternative	  approaches	  will	  also	  acknowledge?	  And	  what	  would	  be	  the	  role	  of	  ‘props’	  in	  such	  imagination?	  Could	  it	  really	  be	  characterised	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  game	  of	  make-­‐believe?	  	   These	  are	  questions	  that	  fictionalism	  will	  have	  to	  answer	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  more	  widely	  accepted	  as	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  theories	  but	  as	  I’ve	  briefly	  indicated,	  the	  abstract	  artefacts	  view	  also	  faces	  challenges.	  It	  may	  well	  be	  that	  these	  challenges	  can	  be	  met	  but	  elsewhere	  Vickers	  and	  I	  have	  proposed	  a	  way	  forward	  that	  cuts	  straight	  through	  this	  knotty	  tangle	  of	  issues	  and	  it	  does	  so	  by	  appealing	  to	  a	  form	  of	  eliminativism	  again.	  	  
Theory	  Eliminativism	  	  The	  core	  slogan	  here	  is	  “There	  are	  no	  such	  things	  as	  theories!”	  (French	  and	  Vickers	  2011;	  see	  also	  Vickers,	  2013).	  	  	   The	  view	  derives	  from	  a	  double-­‐importation:	  first	  from	  metaphysics	  into	  the	  philosophy	  of	  music,	  then	  from	  there	  into	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  We’ve	  already	  
touched	  on	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  musical	  works,	  and	  views	  range	  from	  insisting	  that	  they	  are	  abstract	  artefacts	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  they	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  sum	  of	   all	   their	   performances	   (see	   the	   relevant	   section	   on	   ontology	   in	   Kania	   2014).	  Cameron	  (2008a)	  presented	  a	  novel	  way	  of	  cutting	   through	  all	   the	  arguments	  and	  counter-­‐arguments	  in	  this	  debate	  by	  drawing	  on	  metaphysical	  nihilism	  which	  offers	  a	   framework	   within	   which	   one	   can	   effect	   a	   reduction	   in	   one’s	   ontological	  commitments.	   There	   are	   two	   crucial	   features	   to	   note.	   The	   first	   concerns	   the	  introduction	  of	  a	  form	  of	  ‘truthmaker’	  theory,	  which	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  what	  it	  is	   for	  a	  proposition	   to	  be	   true.	  On	   the	  standard	  understanding	  of	   this	  account,	   the	  truthmaker	  for	  the	  claim	  ‘x	  exists’	  is	  always	  x.	  However,	  Cameron’s	  approach	  allows	  for	  the	  truthmaker	  of	  the	  sentence	  to	  be	  something	  other	  than	  ‘x’,	  so	  the	  claim	  that	  ‘a	  exists’,	   for	   example,	   might	   be	   true	   according	   to	   some	   theory	   without	   a	   being	   an	  ontological	  commitment	  of	  that	  theory	  (Cameron	  [2008b],	  p.	  4).	  The	   second	   feature	   urges	   us	   to	   take	   these	   truthmakers	   to	   lie	   at	   the	   most	  fundamental	  level	  of	  our	  ontology	  –	  namely,	  that	  characterises	  how	  the	  world	  is	  at	  its	  most	  fundamental	  level.	  One	  may	  then	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  two	  different	  types	  of	  statement:	  those	  of	  everyday	  English,	  say,	  and	  that	  describes	  the	  world	  at	  its	   fundamental	   level	   (the	   language	   here	   is	   sometimes	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘Ontologese;	  Cameron	  [2008a]	  p.300f.).	  Thus	   the	  statement,	   ‘there	  are	  statues’,	  uttered	  as	  one	  that	   purportedly	   describes	   the	   fundamental	   level,	   is	   false,	   because	   at	   that	  fundamental	   ontological	   level,	   there	   are	   no	   statues.	   However,	   the	   everyday	   claim,	  ‘there	  are	  statues’	  is	  true,	  but	  not	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  statues,	  again	  at	   the	   fundamental	   level,	   but	   in	   virtue	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   are	   elements	   of	   our	  fundamental	  ontology	  that	  are	  arranged	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  yield	  what	  we	  refer	  to,	  at	  the	  everyday	  level,	  as	  statues	  (ibid.,	  p.301).	  	  And	  of	  course,	  we	  can	  also	  apply	  this	  distinction	   to	  OSR:	   thus	   the	  eliminativist	   structural	   realist	  might	   insist	   that	   ‘there	  
are	  particles’	  is	  false,	  because	  at	  the	  most	  fundamental	  level	  there	  are	  no	  particles	  
qua	  objects,	  only	  structures,	  whereas	  ‘there	  are	  particles’	  is	  true,	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  structures	   ‘arranged’	  such	  as	  to	  yield	  the	  features	  we	  associate	  with	  particles	  (that	   is,	   ‘via	   the	  relevant	  symmetry	  groups	   for	  example;	  see	  French	  2014	  Ch.	  8).	  	   This	   nihilist	  move	   can	   then	   be	   applied	   to	   theories	   themselves	   (French	   and	  Vickers	   2011)	   and	   to	   ease	   the	   reader	   into	   such	   a	   stance,	   let	   me	   return	   to	  fictionalism.	  Thus	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   a	   character	   in	   a	   novel	   –	   Sherlock	  Holmes	  for	  example	  –	  exists,	  Thomasson	  writes,	  	  	  ‘Our	  literary	  practices	  .	  .	  .	  definitively	  establish	  the	  existence	  conditions	  for	  fictional	  characters—that	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  establish	  what	  it	  takes	  in	  a	  given	  situation	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  fictional	  character.	  	  …	  (A.	  Thomasson	  2003)	  	  	  Thus,	  worries	  over	  whether	  Sherlock	  exists	  or	  not	  are	  misguided,	  for	  what	  it	   is	  for	  him	  to	  be	   is	  given	  entirely	  by	   the	  relevant	   literary	  practice.	   	  Cameron	  then	  adapts	  this	  to	  his	  nihilism:	  ‘we	  appeal	  to	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  literary	  practice	  rather	  than	   the	   fictional	   character	   itself	   when	   specifying	   the	   truthmaker	   for	   claims	  concerning	   the	   existence	   of,	   and	   properties	   of,	   the	   fictional	   being.’	   (Cameron	  
forthcoming).	   And	   in	   particular	   he	   insists	   that	   if	   ‘a	   exists’	   is	   made	   true	   by	   some	  truthmaker	   x,	   then	   metaphysical	   concerns	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   a	   should	   simply	  evaporate.	   The	   only	   issue	   now	   is	   whether	   we	   admit	   x	   into	   our	   fundamental	  ontology.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	  novels,	   this	   fundamental	  ontology	   concerns	   the	  afore-­‐mentioned	  literary	  practices	  (ibid,	  p.	  6).	  	   	  We	   can	   then	   make	   a	   third	   importation	   and	   adopt	   such	   a	   nihilist	   stance	  within	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  towards	  theories,	  qua	  entities	  of	  some	  kind	  or	  other:	   ‘there	   are	   theories’,	   asserted	   in	   the	   language	   of	   the	   fundamental	   level,	   is	  false,	  although	  ‘there	  are	  theories’	  uttered	  by	  scientists	  and	  philosophers	  of	  science	  is	  true	  and	  it	  is	  made	  so	  by	  the	  relevant	  truth-­‐makers.	  The	  question	  then,	  of	  course,	  is	  what	  exactly	  are	   the	   features	  of	   the	  world	   that	  ultimately	  make	   true	  our	   talk	  of	  theories?	  And	  the	  answer,	  by	  analogy	  with	  fictional	  characters,	  is	  scientific	  practice;	  so	  (paraphrasing	  Cameron	  and	  following	  Thomasson)	  we	  appeal	  to	  something	  to	  do	  with	   the	   scientific	   practice	   rather	   than	   the	   theory	   itself	   when	   specifying	   the	  truthmaker	   for	   claims	   concerning	   the	   existence	   of,	   and	   properties	   of,	   that	   theory.	  	  The	  task	  then	  is	  to	  pinpoint	  those	  features	  of	  practice	  that	  we	  are	  happy	  to	  accept	  as	  elements	  of	  our	  ‘fundamental	  ontology’	  that	  can	  give	  an	  adequate	  grounding	  to	  our	  talk	  about	  the	  existence	  of,	  and	  properties	  of,	  theories.	  	   So,	  consider	  claims	  that	  are	  true	  of	  theories,	  such	  as	  ‘Quantum	  mechanics	  is	  an	   extremely	   successful	   theory’.	   This	   is	   made	   true	   by	   the	   practices	   involved	   in	  deriving	  novel	  predictions,	  testing	  etc.	  and,	  crucially,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  requiring	   commitment	   to	   some	   entity,	  whether	   abstract	   artefact	   or	   fiction,	   that	   is	  called	   ‘quantum	   mechanics’.	   Or	   consider	   the	   claim,	   ‘Quantum	   mechanics	   is	   an	  elegant	   theory’	   –	   this	   is	   made	   true	   by	   those	   features	   of	   theoretical	   practice	  determined	   to	   possess	   or	   be	   associated	   with	   the	   relevant	   aesthetic	   quality.	   Now	  consider	   claims	   that	   are	   true	   in	   theories,	   such	  as	   ‘According	   to	   standard	  quantum	  mechanics,	  undisturbed	  systems	  obey	  a	  linear	  dynamic’.	  This	  is	  made	  true	  by	  certain	  features	  of	  theoretical	  practice	  that	  are	  determined	  to	  possess	  certain	  mathematical	  features.	   Again,	   there	   is	   no	   commitment	   required	   to	   ‘quantum	   mechanics’	   as	   an	  entity,	  however	  conceived.	  	   	  What	   about	   the	   worry	   that	   if	   there	   were	   no	   people,	   there	   would	   be	   no	  practices,	   and	  hence	  no	   theories?	  Well,	   of	   course	  my	  answer	   is	  blunt:	   there	  never	  were	  any	  theories!	  But	  a	  more	  sensible	  worry	  might	  be,	  if	  scientific	  work	  stops,	  in	  a	  certain	  area,	  so	  there	  were	  no	  (current)	  practices,	  could	  we	  still	  talk	  about	  theories,	  in	  that	  area	  –	  an	  obvious	  answer	  would	  be	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  history	  books	  an	  insist	  that	  such	  talk	  is	  made	  true	  by	  past	  practices.	  That	  is	  how	  we	  can	  continue	  to	  make	  claims	  about	   ‘the	   theory	   of	   phlogiston’	   for	   example,	   even	   though	   the	   relevant	   practices	  have	  long	  since	  ceased.	  	  	   The	  primary	  virtue	  of	  this	  account	  is	  that	  we	  don’t	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  how	  we	  have	  access	  (creative	  or	  otherwise)	  to	  theories	  as	  abstract	  entities,	  nor	  whether	  our	  imaginations	  can	  be	  reasonably	  said	  to	  stretch	  to	  the	  17-­‐dimensional	  spaces	  and	  complex	  stochastic	  models.	  We	  can	  pull	  in	  our	  ontological	  horns	  as	  philosophers	  of	  science	  and	  still	  continue	  to	  make	  all	  the	  claims	  about	  theories	  that	  we	  always	  have,	  
and,	  furthermore,	  this	  account	  encourages	  us	  to	  look	  closer	  to	  the	  actual	  practices	  of	  science,	  which	  is	  surely	  a	  good	  thing!	  	   But	  now	  lets	  return	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  realism,	  whether	  structural	  or	  otherwise	  
–	  how	  can	  we	  accommodate	  the	  kinds	  of	  claims	  made	  in	  that	  context?	  	  
Realism	  without	  Theories	  	  So,	  what	  about	  statements	  like	  ‘theory	  T	  is	  true	  (or	  approximately	  so)’?	  What	  would	  be	   the	   truthmakers	   in	   the	   relevant	   practice	   that	  make	   such	   claims	   true?	  Here	  we	  have	  to	  be	  a	  little	  careful	  as	  such	  statements	  are	  some	  of	  the	  core	  claims	  of	  realism	  and	   a	   constructive	   realist	   would	   not	   accede	   to	   them.	   Thus,	   the	   relevant	   practice	  can’t	   be	   scientific	   practice	   alone	   but	   must	   include	   those	   inferential	   moves	   that	  realists	  appeal	  to	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  their	  claims.	  Hence	  we	  can	  say	  that	  such	  claims	  as	   the	   above	   are	  made	   true	  by	   certain	   truthmakers	   in	   scientific	  and	  philosophical	  practice,	  where	  such	  practice	  might	  include	  the	  No	  Miracles	  Argument,	  for	  example.	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  realists	  and	  anti-­‐realists	  differ	  over	  the	  elements	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  included	  in	  such	  practice	  –	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  they	  can	  be	  regarded	   as	   effectively	   adopting	   different	   stances.	   Thus	   there	   may	   be	   acute	  differences	   in	   what	   constitute	   the	   truthmakers	   for	   such	   claims	   as	   the	   above.	   But	  that’s	  ok,	  because,	  as	  just	  noted,	  constructive	  empiricists,	  at	  least,	  are	  going	  to	  insist	  that	   we	   should	   not	   make	   such	   claims	   to	   begin	   with.	   Recent	   stance	   oriented	  approaches	  to	  the	  realism-­‐antirealism	  debate	  are	  hence	  only	  going	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  if	  they	  imply	  that	  different	  kinds	  of	  realist	  adopt	  radically	  different	  perspectives	  on	  what	  constitutes	  the	  relevant	  set	  of	  truthmaker	  practices,	  and	  certainly	  that	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  demonstrated.	  	  	   Of	  course	  one	  might	  now	  balk	  at	  this	  extension	  of	  eliminativism	  to	  the	  truth	  of	   claims	   about	   the	   truth	   of	   theories!	   Not	   just	   anti-­‐realists	   but	   some	   realists	   will	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  just	  not	  appropriate	  to	  take	  a	  philosophical	  position	  such	  as	  realism	  to	   be	   itself	   true	   –	   or	   at	   least	   not	   in	   the	   standard,	   correspondence	   sense,	   for	  what	  would	  this	  position	  correspond	  to?	  Or,	  thinking	  of	  representation	  again,	   if	  theories	  are	   said	   to	   be	   true,	   or	   approximately	   so,	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   represent	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  world,	  what	  is	  it	  that	  realism	  could	  be	  said	  to	  represent	  in	  this	  way?	  One	  option	  here	  might	  be	  to	  take	  a	  pluralist	  view	  of	  truth	  itself,	  with	  truth-­‐as-­‐correspondence	   appropriate	   for	   certain	   domains	   of	   discourse	   but	   not	   others	   (see	  Wright	   1999).	   In	   that	   domain	   of	   discourse	   that	   concerns	   the	   realism-­‐antirealism	  debate,	  in	  which	  realist	  claims	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  theories	  are	  themselves	  taken	  to	  be	  true	  (by	  realists)	  by	  virtue	  of	  certain	  elements	  of	  philosophical	  practice,	  perhaps	  the	  appropriate	   notion	   of	   truth	   is	   something	  much	  more	   deflationary,	   like	  warranted	  assertibility.	  	  	   Now,	  what	  about	  representation?	  Here,	  it	  would	  seem,	  we	  can	  make	  similar	  moves:	   statements	   such	   as	   ‘Theory	   T	   is	   a	   good/accurate/faithful/whatever	  representation	  of	  target	  system	  S’	  are	  made	  true	  by	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  relevant	  practices,	  where	  again,	   these	  will	  cover	  both	  scientific	  and	  philosophical	  practices,	  insofar	   as	   ‘faithful’	   representation,	   for	   example,	   goes	   beyond	   empirical	   adequacy.	  Again	   we	  might	   wonder	   whether	   the	   framework	   of	   truth	   as	   correspondence	   and	  truthmakers	   are	   entirely	   appropriate	   for	   this	   domain	   of	   discourse.	   But	   there	   is	   a	  further	   concern:	   talk	   of	   representation	   suggests,	   at	   least,	   there	   is	   a	   that	   which	   is	  doing	   the	   representing;	   that	   is,	   something	   that	   stands	   at	   one	   end	   of	   the	  representational	  relationship.	  And	  eliminativism	  about	  theories	  denies	  this.	  	  
	   One	   option	  would	   be	   to	   insist	   that	   there	   is	   strictly	   nothing	   standing	   in	   the	  representational	   relationship;	   theories	  are	  not	   like	  paintings,	   from	  which	  so	  many	  examples	   and	   counter-­‐examples	   have	   been	   drawn;	   and	   representation	   is	   an	  inappropriate	   device	   for	   capturing	   the	   kinds	   of	   claims	   we	   want	   to	   make.	   An	  alternative	   line	  would	  be	   to	   suggest	   that	  what	   is	   standing	   in	   that	   relationship	   is	   a	  meta-­‐level	  construction	  that	  we,	  as	  philosophers	  of	  science	  (or	  scientists	  when	  they	  are	  in	  philosophical	  mode),	  deploy	  when	  we	  endeavour	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  scientific	  practice	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   our	  understanding	  of	   the	  world.	   The	   idea	   then	   is	  that	  when	  we,	  philosophers	  (or	  again,	  scientists	  or	  others	  thinking	  philosophically),	  talk	  (seriously)	  about	  theories	  representing	  some	  target	  system,	  we	  have	  in	  mind,	  if	  perhaps	  only	   implicitly,	   some	  way	  of	   ‘representing’	   theories	   themselves	  and	   these	  systems.	  If	  one	  is	  an	  adherent	  of	  the	  syntactic	  approach,	  then	  the	  theory	  can	  be	  said	  to	   be	   ‘represented’	   logico-­‐linguistically	   and	   a	   referential	   relationship	   with	   the	  relevant	  elements	  of	  reality	  established	  in	  those	  terms.	  If	  one	  is	  an	  advocate	  of	  the	  SA,	  then,	  likewise,	  one	  ‘represents’	  the	  theory	  at	  the	  meta-­‐level	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  in	  terms	  of	  set	  theory	  and	  also	  ‘represents’	  the	  way	  the	  theory	  latches	  onto	  the	   world	   via	   the	   formal	   notion	   of	   (partial)	   isomorphism,	   which	   of	   course	   then	  relates	   to	   the	   formal	   representation	   of	   the	   target	   system	   (in	   order	   to	   sidestep	  protests	   that	   set	   theoretical	   notions	   cannot	   relate	   mathematical	   structures	   and	  physical	  ones).	  However,	  I’ve	  put	  the	  word	  represent	  in	  scare	  quotes	  because	  there	  is	   nothing	   for	   either	   the	   logico-­‐lingustic	   set	   of	   propositions	   or	   set	   theoretical	  structure	   to	   actually	   represent.	   Instead,	   these	   devices	   should	   be	   understood	   as	  constructions	  that	  we	  philosophers	  of	  science	  use	  to	  do	  our	   jobs.	  Thus,	   the	  object-­‐level	  relation	  of	  representation	  does	  not	  hold	  between	  the	  relevant	  features	  of	  the	  world	   and	   theory,	   per	   se,	   but	   between	   those	   features	   and	   our	   logico-­‐linguistic	   or	  set-­‐theoretic	   or	   whatever,	   construction.	   Furthermore,	   statements	   about	   *that*	  representation	  are	  made	  true	  by	  the	  appropriate	  features	  of	  history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  practice.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  As	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  we	  deploy	  various	  resources,	  such	  as	  the	  SA,	  in	  order	  to	  do	   what	   we	   want	   to	   do	   as	   philosophers	   and	   thus	   to	   achieve	   our	   aims.	   These	  resources	   come	  with	   various	   benefits	   and	   disadvantages	   and	   one	   can	   argue	   for	   a	  pluralistic	   view	   that	   suggests	   we	   deploy	   whatever	   available	   resources	   are	   most	  appropriate	   for	   the	   job	   at	   hand.	   When	   it	   comes	   to	   capturing	   inter-­‐theoretic	   or	  theory-­‐data	  relations,	  like	  many	  people	  I	  think	  the	  SA	  offers	  the	  best	  set	  of	  tools	  for	  the	  job.	  But	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  move	  from	  that	  view	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  theories	  
are	  set-­‐theoretic	  in	  some	  sense.	  	   Furthermore,	  new	  developments	  in	  realism	  put	  pressure	  on	  those	  resources,	  as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   ontic	   structural	   realism	   and	   representation.	   However,	   there	   are	  ways	   of	   resisting	   or,	   at	   least,	   sidestepping	   that	   pressure	   via	   the	   appropriation	   of	  further	  resources,	  including	  some	  that	  are	  metaphysical	  or	  methodological.	  We	  can	  for	  example	  cut	   through	  concerns	  about	  what	  sorts	  of	   things	   theories	  are	  and	  end	  that	   particular	   debate	   by	   importing	   a	   form	  of	   nihilism	   and	   associated	   truthmaker	  theory	  from	  metaphysics.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  continue	  talking	  about	  theories	  without	  
being	  committed	  to	  them	  as	  abstract	  entities	  or	  whatever.	  From	  this	  perspective	  the	  SA	   can	  be	   see	   as	   no	  more	   than	   a	   construction,	   deployed	  by	  us	   as	   philosophers	   of	  science	  to	  achieve	  our	  own	  ends	  and	  certainly	  not	  as	  constitutive	  (either	  of	  theories	  or	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   world).	   The	   focus	   then	   shifts	   back,	   as	   it	   should,	   to	   the	  practices	  that	  ground	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  claims	  we	  make	  about	  theories,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  ontological	  nature	  and	   identity	  conditions	  of	   the	   latter.	   Just	  as	  ontic	  structural	  realism	   frees	   us	   from	   a	   dependence	   on	   outdated	   metaphysics,	   so	   this	   view	   of	  theories	  themselves	  should	  free	  us	  from	  relying	  on	  often	  inappropriate	  comparisons	  with	   artworks	   and	   encourage	   us	   to	   pay	   more	   attention	   to	   the	   issues	   that	   really	  matter.	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